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Protecting Rights in Mental Health Law: The Relationship between 
the Courts and Mental Health Tribunals 
Darius Whelan 
Chapter in Mary Donnelly and Claire Murray (eds.), Ethical and Legal Debates in 
Irish Healthcare: Confronting Complexities (Manchester University Press, 2016), 
pp.208-221.  
 
Introduction   
Mental health law, and in particular the law concerning involuntary detention, has been a subject of 
protracted debate in Irish society.  The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held in Winterwerp 
v The Netherlands (1979-80) 2 EHRR 387 that, except in emergency cases, the decision to detain a 
‘person of unsound mind’ must be supported by objective medical expertise, the mental disorder must 
be serious enough to warrant compulsory confinement, and the validity of confinement must be based 
on the persistence of the disorder (at para. 39). Article 5(4) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) does not necessarily require that all detentions be automatically reviewed, as long as a 
detained person has the right to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his or her detention shall 
be decided speedily by a ‘court’ (which includes independent tribunals). Ireland’s Mental Health Act 
2001 requires that all involuntary admissions for mental disorder be reviewed within twenty-one days 
by a three-person Mental Health Tribunal (MHT).  The tribunals review both procedural and substantive 
aspects of the person’s detention.  Under section 18 of the 2001 Act, they also have the power to waive 
or ‘cure’ a procedural defect which may have occurred, provided the defect does not affect the 
substance of the order and does not cause an injustice.   
The tribunal system became operational in 2006, and there are hundreds of hearings each 
year.1  Inevitably, there has been a significant amount of litigation about the exact parameters of the 
tribunals’ powers and the relationship between the tribunals and the courts.  This litigation has been an 
important opportunity for the courts to establish principles and standards for the tribunals. As a person’s 
liberty is at stake, it would be expected as a matter of policy that courts would subject the tribunal 
                                                     
1
   For example, there were 1,896 hearings by the MHTs in 2013 - Mental Health Commission (2014), 
p. 43.   
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process to very strict scrutiny.  However, there is strong evidence that the Irish courts are, in general, 
extremely deferential to the decisions of Mental Health Tribunals.  The courts’ approach raises serious 
questions about their commitment to the rights of persons detained under mental health legislation.     
In this chapter, the focus will be on key written judgments of the High Court and Supreme Court 
where the courts have in some way reviewed a decision of a Mental Health Tribunal. The issues will be 
considered under five headings: an examination of the remedies of applications under Article 40 and 
judicial reviews; the MHTs’ power to review procedural matters; the power to waive procedural 
irregularities; statements from the courts concerning the importance of MHTs following procedures 
correctly and the relevance of the ECHR and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD). Detailed accounts of the Mental Health Act 2001 and case-law interpreting it may be found in 
literature by authors such as Keys (2002), O’Neill (2005), Whelan (2009) and Casey et al. (2010). An 
expert group has recently recommended various reforms of the 2001 Act (Expert Group on the Review 
of the Mental Health Act 2001, 2015).   
Despite some statements to the contrary, the general picture which emerges is that the courts 
have not engaged in robust supervision of mental health tribunals.  Instead, the general tenor of the 
case-law has been to endorse decisions of tribunals to affirm detentions, and to limit access to the 
courts to the most extreme violations of procedural rights.  This is a disappointing outcome, in light of 
the supposed rights-based focus of the Mental Health Act 2001.   
Remedies: Applications under Article 40 and Judicial Reviews 
The focus of this chapter will be on cases which took the form either of an application under Article 40 
of the Constitution or a Judicial Review.  These remedies have distinct features which significantly 
impact on the courts’ role.   
An application under Article 40 of the Constitution (which is also known as a habeas corpus 
application, although there are technical differences) is an inquiry by the High Court into the lawfulness 
of a person’s detention.  The onus is on the detaining authority to justify the detention and if it is not 
justified, the person must be released.2   
                                                     
2
   The courts may use the technique of delayed or ‘staggered’ release if a person has a serious 
mental disorder and may require to be detained again – see Whelan (2009), 2-42 to 2-44 and also the 
recent case of F.X. v Clinical Director of Central Mental Hospital [2014] IESC 1.     
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As Mental Health Tribunals are public bodies, their decisions may alternatively be challenged 
by way of a Judicial Review application in the High Court.  This is a more flexible remedy than an 
application under Article 40 as issues other than the current legality of the detention may be considered.  
For example, the person may seek a declaration that one of the actions which took place in the chain 
of events was unlawful, or that a particular section of the 2001 Act is repugnant to the Constitution or 
incompatible with the ECHR.  The grounds for judicial review are mainly procedural and the courts will 
generally steer away from consideration of the merits of the decision.     
In cases concerning the 2001 Act, the courts have applied four limitations on the availability of 
these remedies.  Firstly, in the key Supreme Court case of E.H. v Clinical Director of St. Vincent's 
Hospital [2009] IESC 46, para.50, it was held that an application under Article 40 should only be brought 
if ‘the best interests of the patient so demand’ (see further Whelan, 2012).  This limits the availability of 
the remedy and has had a chilling effect on potential challenges to detention.  Given that ‘best interests’ 
in this context appear to be equated with medical best interests, the case represents a remarkable 
prioritisation of medical considerations over legal ones. It has been commented that courts tend to be 
deferential to medical opinion (Teff, 1994: xxiii-xxiv) and this may be seen as a further example of this 
phenomenon (see further Whelan, 2009; Irish Human Rights Commission, 2010; Lynn, 2010; Murray, 
2010).   
Secondly, in T.O’D. v Kennedy [2007] IEHC 129, Charleton J. commented that if there are 
procedural issues with a detention, the ‘ordinary remedy’ is to being these matters before the tribunal.  
He said that the High Court in exercising its jurisdiction under Article 40 of the Constitution has a much 
more limited function in simply declaring, at any particular point in time, whether someone is or is not 
lawfully detained. It can review the MHT’s decisions but he did not see that this would be either 
appropriate or necessary if the statutory scheme was followed. He said that he ‘would expressly hold 
that if at a time when the High Court considers an application for habeas corpus, a period of unlawful 
detention has been cured validly by a decision of the mental health tribunal under section 18(1) of the 
Mental Health Act 2001 that [sic] the remedy is no longer available.’ This view would appear to unduly 
restrict the availability of the remedy of an application under Article 40, placing unwarranted weight on 
the decision of a MHT as to which procedural defects are sufficiently minor to be waived.   
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Thirdly, the courts have repeatedly held that there is no ‘domino effect’ in applications under 
Article 40.  If there is an unlawfulness at an earlier stage of detention, it may be ‘cured’ by a subsequent 
lawful detention.  For example, in R.L. v Clinical Director of St. Brendan’s Hospital (Supreme Court, ex 
tempore, 15 February 2008), the Supreme Court held that even if there had been breaches of section 
13 of the 2001 Act (regarding removal of the person to the hospital), this would not render what is on 
the face of it a lawful detention on foot of an admission order invalid (at 5-6).  The courts have contrasted 
this with a criminal matter, where different reasoning might apply, and previous matters which have a 
causal relationship with the present detention might need to be considered.3  However, if a stage in the 
statutory procedure for involuntary admission is omitted completely, a different outcome may result.  In 
S.O. v Clinical Director of Adelaide and Meath Hospital [2013] IEHC 132 there had been a failure to 
comply with the requirement that a doctor should examine the person before making a recommendation 
that the person be admitted under the Act and Hogan J. therefore ordered that the person’s subsequent 
admission was unlawful.   
Fourthly, O’Malley J. noted in D.H. v Clinical Director of St. Patrick’s Hospital (High Court, ex 
tempore, 18 June 2012) that, as Judicial Review is a discretionary remedy, the court might in some 
cases take into account the powers of the MHT in deciding whether to exercise the court’s discretion.  
Her suggestion seemed to be that on occasions the court might refuse the remedy of Judicial Review 
due to the existence of the MHT’s parallel ‘sort of mini judicial review jurisdiction of its own’ (at 2).  On 
the other hand, O’Malley J. also stated in that case that, where personal liberty is at stake, she would 
be ‘reluctant to close the door to the person seeking the protection of the High Court’ (at 2).  
The MHTs’ power to review procedural matters  
The function of the MHT hearing is to review the person’s detention and decide whether to confirm or 
revoke the relevant admission or renewal order.  According to section 18 of the Act, to affirm the order, 
the MHT must be satisfied that  
1. the person is ‘suffering from a mental disorder’ and  
                                                     
3
   S.C. v Clinical Director of St. Brigid’s Hospital, Supreme Court, 13 March 2009, Judgment not 
available, quoted in E.H. v Clinical Director of St. Vincent's Hospital [2009] IESC 46; [2009] 3 IR 774 
at 792.   
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2. [certain procedures] have been complied with, or, ‘if there has been a failure to comply with 
[these procedures], that the failure does not affect the substance of the order and does not 
cause an injustice.’4  
The MHTs therefore are clearly required to consider procedural matters, which is in sharp contrast 
to the powers of the first tier tribunals in England, which may not consider procedural issues (section 
72 Mental Health Act 1983, England and Wales, as amended).  However, only certain procedural 
matters may be reviewed by MHTs.  A difficult issue is whether the lack of power to review certain 
procedural sections leads to a breach of the ECHR.   
Article 5(4) of the ECHR states that a detained person has the right to take proceedings by which 
the lawfulness of his or her detention shall be decided speedily by a ‘court’ (which includes independent 
tribunals). It can be argued that MHTs must have the power to review, without restrictions, both the 
substantive and procedural aspects of the person’s detention.  The primary authority for this argument 
is Brogan v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 117, a case concerning detention under the Prevention 
of Terrorism Act 1984, where it was held that arrested or detained persons are entitled to a review 
hearing upon the procedural and substantive conditions which are essential for the ‘lawfulness’, in the 
sense of the ECHR, of their deprivation of liberty. Thus, an Article 5(4) ‘court’ reviewing detention (which 
includes mental health tribunals) must be able to review both procedural and substantive grounds for a 
person’s detention.  This was confirmed in Nikolova v Bulgaria (2001) 31 EHRR 3, a case concerning 
an appeal against a remand in custody on a criminal charge. There are possible counter-arguments 
which may be made, by referring for example to the fact that an application under Article 40 of the 
Constitution could be used to ‘fill in the gaps’ in the powers of MHTs (see Whelan, 2009: para. 9-16).5 
An attempt of sorts was made to raise this issue in C.C. v Clinical Director of St. Patrick’s Hospital 
(No.1), but the judgment only considers one aspect of the issue.  It was argued that MHTs ought to 
have power to release a person if section 13 of the 2001 Act, concerning removals to hospitals, were 
                                                     
4
 The tribunal must be satisfied ‘that the provisions of sections 9, 10, 12, 14, 15 and 16, where 
applicable, have been complied with.’   
5
   See also X. v United Kingdom (1981) 4 EHRR 188, where it was held that a review by way of 
habeas corpus procedure in England was not sufficient for a continuing confinement.  The court 
referred to the fact that in habeas corpus cases, the case is considered on the basis of affidavit 
evidence, and the focus is on enquiring into whether the detention is in compliance with the 
requirements stated in the relevant legislation and with the applicable principles of the common law.   
As a result, the habeas corpus proceedings were not in compliance with Article 5(4) of the ECHR.   
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breached, even though section 13 is not one of the listed procedural sections which may be reviewed 
by the tribunal. The applicant relied on Storck v Germany (2006) 43 EHRR 6 in which it was held that 
Article 5(1) of the ECHR lays down a positive obligation on the State to protect the liberty of its citizens, 
and that the State cannot absolve itself from responsibility by delegating its obligations in such matters 
to private bodies.  McMahon J. rejected this argument, referring to the fact that the MHT had offered an 
adjournment to the applicant.  He continued: 
Had the applicant availed of the adjournment it would have given the applicant’s solicitor the 
opportunity of making the same request to those who had power of release including 
presumably the clinical director. If the applicant got no satisfaction from the clinical director then 
the applicant could have commenced proceedings against the clinical director’s refusal under 
Art.40.4 of the Constitution. A claim, however, that the State failed under the Convention to 
protect the applicant’s right to liberty, because the Tribunal did not have the power under the 
Act, is not sustainable for the simple reason that the applicant did not have the correct target 
for his complaint (at 27).  
This only deals with one aspect of the case-law on Article 5 – the fact that a state cannot delegate its 
responsibility to protect citizens’ liberty to private bodies.  There had been no tribunal or court review of 
the person’s first stay in the clinic in the Storck case, and so the case has very little relevance to the 
question of the scope of such a review if such a review takes place.   
The power to waive procedural irregularities 
As stated earlier, MHTs have the power, under section 18 of the 2001 Act, to waive a procedural 
irregularity under certain listed sections if ‘the failure does not affect the substance of the order and 
does not cause an injustice.’  In a series of cases, mainly clustered in the period from April to July 2007, 
the courts interpreted section 18 inconsistently.  The details of these cases may be found elsewhere 
(Whelan, 2009: 9-24-9-38) but the main points will now be reviewed, before turning to some more recent 
case-law.  Interestingly, two of the 2007 cases6 concerned procedural compliance with sections 23 and 
24 of the 2001 Act, which concern re-grading of persons from voluntary to involuntary status, even 
though technically a MHT does not have power to consider compliance with those sections.  As 
technically the tribunals did not have jurisdiction to consider these sections, the comments of the High 
Court in those cases may also, technically, not be binding on future courts.   
                                                     
6
   Q. v Governor of St Patrick’s Hospital, High Court, O’Higgins J., ex tempore, 21 December 2006 
and T.O’D. v Kennedy [2007] 3 IR 689.  Another example is N.B. v Clinical Director of Our Lady's 
Hospital Navan and Others [2007] IEHC 403.   
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In the 2007 cases, there were clearly two schools of thought:  some cases held that section 18 
could only be used to excuse minor failures of an insubstantial nature, while others held that tribunals 
could excuse virtually any procedural defect, unless it was in reckless disregard of the statutory scheme.  
Statistically speaking, there was more support for the first school.  O’Neill J. held in W.Q. v Mental 
Health Commission [2007] IEHC 154 that only failures of an insubstantial nature which did not cause 
an injustice could be excused.  In that case, he held that it was not permissible for a Renewal Order to 
be signed by a psychiatrist from outside the hospital, who was not involved in care and treatment, but 
was brought in for the purposes of review.  This approach was expressly followed by Mac Menamin J. 
in J.B. v Director of the Central Mental Hospital (No.2) [2007] IEHC 201, a case where it was found that 
the person was in lawful detention even though the Renewal Order was signed by a psychiatrist who 
was not on the staff of the hospital in which the person was detained.  Similar reasoning was used by 
O’Higgins J. in Q. v Governor of St. Patrick’s Hospital (High Court, O’Higgins J., ex tempore, 21 
December 2006), where he held that one cannot do violence to the section and a tribunal cannot excuse 
a failure to use sections 23 and 24 in sequence.  This approach was also supported indirectly by 
Hardiman J. in M.D. v Clinical Director of St. Brendan’s Hospital [2007] IEHC 183 when he stated that 
tribunals must contribute to a situation of total compliance with statutory provisions, although admittedly 
he was focusing on the necessity for the MHT to record its decision carefully rather than on the meaning 
of section 18.   
Charleton J. belonged to the second school; in T.O’D. v Kennedy [2007] IEHC 129 he stated 
that section 18 refers to the entirety of the relevant sections, not simply minor matters as to typing, time 
or procedure and he held that a tribunal could affirm a detention under section 23 which was six days 
longer than permitted.  This reasoning was approved of by Peart J. in J.H. v Lawlor [2007] IEHC 225, 
concerning a detention which was twenty minutes longer than permitted, although Peart J. did say that 
each case of delay would have to be considered in its own context and on its own facts.  O’Keeffe J. 
also adopted the second school of thought in A.R. v Clinical Director of St. Brendan’s Hospital [2009] 
IEHC 143, concerning failure on the part of a psychiatrist to tick a box on a renewal form indicating that 
the person continued to suffer from a mental disorder.   
There have been fewer cases since 2007 in which the meaning of section 18 has been 
considered.  In G.F. v Clinical Director of Acute Psychiatric Unit [2013] IEHC 309, a doctor had signed 
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a recommendation for admission in which he stated the person’s clinical condition but did not tick a box 
indicating which subsection(s) of section 3 applied to the person’s mental disorder.  This meant that on 
a strict reading of the form, the doctor had not recommended the person’s admission.  The tribunal 
decided that this was a breach of the Act but it did not affect the substance of the admission order or 
cause an injustice.  Hogan J. stated: 
In my view, while no procedural error is excluded ex ante from the scope of section 18, the task 
of the Tribunal under this section is essentially to examine whether the substance of the 
procedural protections was satisfied and to ensure that any non-compliance did not cause an 
injustice (at para. 9).  
He went on to hold that the case was ‘really indistinguishable’ from the A.R. case, and applying that 
case by analogy, the tribunal was entitled to apply its section 18 powers and affirm the person’s 
detention. 
Although section 18 was not specifically mentioned in D. v Health Service Executive [2009] 
IEHC 488, there was an endorsement of the tribunal’s decision to consider the report of an independent 
psychiatrist in circumstances where the independent psychiatrist had (for understandable reasons) not 
had an opportunity to interview the responsible consultant psychiatrist.  The requirement that this 
interview take place is contained in section 17, which is not one of the listed procedural sections which 
the tribunal may consider.7  Peart J. noted a submission by counsel that compliance with section 17 
could not be considered by the tribunal, but did not return to this issue in his judgment.  It is also unclear 
whether the tribunal explicitly relied on section 18 to ‘cure’ the lack of interview between the two 
psychiatrists.  Ultimately, Peart J. found that ‘the defect, if it be that, in the report is not so fundamental 
as to invalidate the report to the extent that the tribunal could not be entitled to have regard to it’ (at p. 
8). In his view the tribunal was entitled to decide as it did and proceed, if it so decided, to affirm the 
order.     
Hogan J. enunciated a new principle concerning the meaning of section 18 in the recent case 
of P.D. v Clinical Director, Department of Psychiatry, Connolly Hospital [2014] IEHC 58.  A psychiatrist 
had intended to make a second renewal order for a three-month period, but had made two mistakes on 
                                                     
7
   See W.Q. v Mental Health Commission [2007] IEHC 154; [2007] 3 IR 755 at 769, where one of the 
points raised was that a tribunal had not been convened under s. 17 to review the person’s detention 
before the renewal order was made.  O’Neill J. noted that this matter was outside the scope of the 
tribunal’s consideration because s. 17 is not listed amongst the sections in respect of which an MHT 
is required to consider compliance.   
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the renewal order:  she completed the wrong part of the form, filling out the reference to section 15(2) 
of the 2001 Act rather than section 15(3), and she inserted the wrong date, referring to either 13 or 14 
April 2013 (when she should have referred to 12 April 2014).  The tribunal had waived these 
irregularities, relying on its power under section 18.  Hogan J. held that the detention was unlawful, as 
the renewal order was bad on its face, and therefore this was not a case where the provisions of section 
18(1)(a)(ii) came into play at all.   
The reasoning applied by the court in this case is noteworthy.  Hogan J. noted that a critical 
point is that the tribunal’s task is simply to review the earlier admission or renewal order. Even where 
the tribunal affirms such an order, the decision of the Tribunal does not actually supplant or replace the 
earlier order. The renewal order itself remains the basis for the detention.  Section 18 did not come into 
play at all because it concerns infirmities which might attach to the renewal order by reason of earlier 
non-compliance with certain key procedural requirements prescribed by the 2001 Act.  Hogan J. 
continued: 
This, however, is not quite what has happened here. It is not suggested that there has, in fact, 
been some prior non-compliance with statutory formalities such as might render invalid a 
renewal order which is otherwise good on its face. It is rather a question of whether the order – 
in this case, the renewal order of 13th January 2014 – is, in fact, good on its face and whether 
it recites an appropriate legal basis for the applicant’s detention (at para. 8). 
Hogan J. then discussed an immigration case, G.E. v Governor of Cloverhill Prison [2011] IESC 41, in 
which the Supreme Court held that a notice refusing leave to land in the state was invalid on its face 
and therefore the applicant’s detention was unlawful.  Applying these standards, he held that the errors 
on the face of the document were too significant to admit of any conclusion other than that the renewal 
order was bad on its face.  Hogan J. concluded that the clinical director in this case had not clearly 
established the lawful basis for the detention in the manner required by Article 40 of the Constitution.  
He commented that the Oireachtas might well consider amending the 2001 Act to enable obvious 
clerical errors of this kind to be corrected ‘by means of a form of slip rule procedure, along, of course, 
with safeguards and external supervision of any changes to an admissions order or renewal order’ (at 
para. 16). 
This is a very significant finding for cases where such an error arises in future.   It re-opens the 
prospect of the courts applying a stricter approach to construction of documentation in detentions under 
the Mental Health Act, especially where there is an error in the most recent document justifying 
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detention at the time of the tribunal or court hearing.  It is notable that Hogan J. did not review the 
previous case-law on section 18, and moved very quickly to immigration case-law regarding the validity 
of a detention based on a document which is bad on its face.  He also did not refer to the best interests 
principle, or to the E.H. case, where it was held that ‘mere technical defects’ should not give rise to a 
‘rush to court’ (at para. 50).  Questions remain open as to whether, if the G.E. principle were being 
applied to some of the 2007 case-law on the meaning of section 18, a different result would have been 
reached.  For example, was the detention in the T.O’D. case, which was six days longer than permitted, 
bad on its face?   
Unfortunately, it is not possible to state definitively what the current legal position is regarding 
the meaning of section 18(1)(a)(ii).  There appears to be more support for the view that it can only be 
used to excuse minor failures of an insubstantial nature, but it is possible that the courts will swing again 
in the opposite direction.  From the perspective of constitutional and human rights, the view that section 
18 can only be used to excuse minor failures would be more appropriate, given that the person’s liberty 
is at stake.  In a review of the issue in 2011, Amnesty International Ireland recommended clarification 
of the statutory wording by referring to ‘minor failures of compliance which are of an insubstantial nature’ 
(2011: 109). The Expert Group on the Review of the Mental Health Act 2001 (2015: 50) decided not to 
recommend a change in the wording of s.18, although the emphasis in the group’s report was on 
whether or not a “slip rule” allowing rectification of errors within 14 days of admission should be 
introduced. 
Statements from the courts concerning the importance of MHTs following procedures correctly  
The courts have made some statements to the effect that it is very important that MHTs follow 
procedures correctly.  The most significant example is M.D. v Clinical Director of St. Brendan’s Hospital 
[2008] 1 IR 632, a case in which the psychiatrist had failed to tick the relevant box on the information 
notice to notify the person whether he was being detained under an admission order or a renewal order, 
which was a breach of section 16 of the 2001 Act. The tribunal had affirmed the person’s detention.  In 
the High Court, Peart J. held (at p. 640) that the psychiatrist’s oversight did not result in any 
unlawfulness of detention. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, a second tribunal hearing 
had been held, which also affirmed the person’s detention.  While the Supreme Court found the 
detention to be lawful, Hardiman J. considered the question of the role of the tribunal in such a case in 
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more detail.  Referring to the tribunal’s recording of reasons for its decision, he said that this was an 
absolutely essential part of the tribunal's functions and neither the psychiatrist nor the tribunal could 
avoid or frustrate the review simply by the making of an inadequate or insufficient record of the exercise 
by them of the very considerable powers conferred upon them by statute (at p.644).  
When the tribunal was filling in the form which recorded its decision, it ticked both the box which 
indicated that the provisions of sections 9, 10, 12, 14, 15 and 16 had been complied with and the box 
indicating that if there had been a failure to comply with any such provisions, the failure did not affect 
the substance of the order and did not cause an injustice. Hardiman J. expressed concern that, the 
psychiatrist having omitted to comply with section 16, the tribunal nevertheless certified that section 16 
had been complied with when ‘it manifestly had not’ (at p. 649).  
Hardiman J. made the following additional comments regarding the tribunal’s decision:  
In my view it was illogical to reach both of these findings. If the first finding was correct, the 
second was otiose. If the proviso contained in section 18(1)(a)(ii) (that there has been a failure 
it did not affect the substance of the order or cause an injustice) requires to be invoked, as it 
did, then that situation will arise only if there has in fact been a failure to comply with some 
section of the Act of 2001. Moreover, I cannot see how it can be certified, as it was, that if there 
has been a failure to comply with any such provision then the failure did not affect the substance 
of the order and did not cause an injustice unless the precise failure in question is identified 
and its effect ascertained (at p. 649). 
He also stated that the tribunal consists of three persons, a lay representative, a lawyer and a 
psychiatrist. It was important that, if it is found that a particular section of the 2001 Act has not been 
complied with, that fact should be ascertained, recorded, and its effect discussed. Only in this way can 
the mental health tribunal hope to contribute to a situation of total compliance with the statutory 
provisions (at p. 649).  
Hardiman J’s comments are an important expression, at Supreme Court level, of the 
importance of following procedures correctly.  His strong emphasis on the need for tribunals to comply 
with the Act, and principles of natural justice, in full sends a significant signal to members of tribunals 
and guides them in the performance of their role.   
The relevance of the ECHR and the CRPD  
In the case-law on the Mental Health Act 2001 to date, there have only been a small number of 
references to ECHR case-law,  and the courts have generally tended to distinguish the ECHR cases 
rather than apply them to the issues in the case (on the relevance of the ECHR to mental health law, 
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see Bartlett et al., 2006).  A good example here is E.H. v Clinical Director of St. Vincent’s Hospital [2009] 
IESC 46,  where the person sought to challenge her classification as a voluntary patient from December 
10 to 22, 2008, when she arguably lacked capacity to be “voluntary” and was not free to leave the 
hospital.  Heavy reliance was placed in the legal argument on H.L. v United Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 
32, also known as the ‘Bournewood gap’ case.  However, the Supreme Court held that the H.L. case 
was not relevant as it could not bear on the applicant’s detention subsequent to December 22, thus 
glossing over the fact that from December 10 to 22, the procedural safeguards of the Mental Health Act 
were not available to the person (for fuller discussion of E.H. see Whelan, 2009: 5-32-5-37 and Murray, 
2010). Another case where ECHR case-law was distinguished is P.L. v Clinical Director of St Patrick’s 
University Hospital (No.2) [2012] IEHC 547.  
These decisions have sent a signal to Mental Health Tribunals that, in general, ECHR case-law 
is not very relevant to their deliberations.  This is a matter of concern, as clearly the tribunals, as organs 
of the state, are required to perform their functions in a manner compatible with the State’s obligations 
under the Convention (section 3 ECHR Act 2003; Kilkelly, 2009; De Londras and Kelly, 2010). This 
means that, in principle, decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg should be 
taken very seriously by the tribunals.  No case concerning the 2001 Act has been brought to the 
Strasbourg court since the Act came into force.  This is surprising, as if a person were to challenge the 
Act’s provisions concerning voluntary status before the ECtHR, it is likely that such a challenge would 
succeed.     
While the state has not yet ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD),8 the European Court of Human Rights has held that the CRPD may be used as an aid to 
interpreting the ECHR (Glor v Switzerland, Application No. 13444/04, Judgment 30 April 2009; Stanev 
v Bulgaria, (2012) 55 EHRR 22).  Furthermore, Mac Menamin J. held in M.X. v Health Service Executive 
[2012] IEHC 491 that the CRPD is a helpful reference point in interpreting constitutional rights.  It will 
be interesting to see, as awareness of the CRPD grows, and as the state moves to its ultimate 
ratification, whether it will have an impact on the courts’ approach to issues of interpretation of the 
Mental Health Act.  For example, the courts may have difficulty in reconciling the prohibition on 
                                                     
8
  For consideration of the relationship between the CRPD and mental health law, see for example 
Doyle (2010), Fennell and Khaliq (2011), Bartlett (2012), Morrissey (2012) and Szmukler et al. (2014).   
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deprivations of liberty based on disability in Article 14 of the CRPD with the right to detain ‘persons of 
unsound mind’ under Article 5 of the ECHR.   
Conclusion 
The decisions of the courts regarding Mental Health Tribunals have been affected to a great extent by 
the limitations of the application under Article 40 as a remedy.  In applications under Article 40, the 
courts will not, in general, find that the detention is unlawful if there have been ‘mere technical defects’ 
in the process.  Judicial Review is a more flexible remedy, but most of the applications to date have 
been brought under Article 40 instead.  Lawyers’ preference for applications under Article 40 appears 
to relate to its relatively speedy availability as a remedy, and the possible easier availability of free legal 
aid for such a case. The courts’ reluctance to find detention unlawful is also informed by their 
paternalistic interpretation of the ‘best interests’ principle.  The E.H. case, in requiring legal 
representatives to consider the person’s best interests, has had a chilling effect on litigation.   
The courts have not been consistent in their interpretation of the power of the MHTs, under 
section 18 of the Mental Health Act, to waive procedural irregularities in the process.  Some cases 
suggest that this power should only be used to waive minor irregularities; others suggest that tribunals 
may ‘cure’ more significant procedural breaches.  In some cases, tribunals have waived procedural 
irregularities regarding sections which they are not even empowered to consider.  More recently, it has 
been held in the P.D. case that if the current order justifying detention is bad on its face, section 18 
does not even ‘come into play’ at all.  It may be that a statutory amendment is required to clarify the 
meaning of section 18. 
There have been very few references to the ECHR or the CRPD in the case-law.  When the 
ECHR has been referred to, the courts tend to distinguish the relevant cases so that they are held not 
to apply.  This is an issue of concern as tribunals may take this as a signal that they can conduct their 
reviews without regard to ECHR case-law when in fact they are statutorily obliged to do so under the 
ECHR Act 2003.    
On the whole, the courts have tended to give very wide latitude to the tribunals in their decision-
making, when closer supervision seems warranted.  While the Mental Health Act heralded a new era 
of rights-based mental health law in many respects and was intended to ensure compliance with 
international obligations, the Irish courts have not embraced this new era and have preferred to hark 
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back to paternalistic reasoning from the 1940s.   Further legislative change may assist in re-orientating 
the courts’ perspective more to the rights-based approach, although they may continue to refuse to 
change what appears to be a deeply entrenched approach even if required to do so by new legislation. 
 
References 
Amnesty International Ireland (2011) Mental Health Act 2001: a review. Dublin: Amnesty International 
Ireland.  
Bartlett, P. (2012) ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and mental 
health law’, Modern Law Review, 75 (5), pp. 752-778.   
Bartlett, P., Lewis, O. and Thorold, O. (2006) Mental disability and the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff.  
Casey, P., Brady, P., Craven, C. and Dillon, A. (2010) Psychiatry and the law. 2nd edition. Dublin:  
Blackhall Publishing.   
De Londras, F. and Kelly, C. (2010) European Convention on Human Rights Act: operation, impact and 
analysis. Dublin: Round Hall.   
Doyle, S. (2010) ‘The new paradigm for involuntary detention - Article 14 of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the right to liberty of persons with mental disabilities’, Irish 
Yearbook of International Law, 4-5, pp. 71-118.   
Expert Group on the Review of the Mental Health Act 2001 (2015) Report of the Expert Group on the 
Review of the Mental Health Act 2001. Dublin: Department of Health.   
Fennell, P. and Khaliq, U. (2011) ‘Conflicting or complementary obligations? The UN disability rights 
Convention on human rights and English law’, European Human Rights Law Review, 2011 (6), pp. 
662-74.    
Irish Human Rights Commission (2010) Policy paper concerning the definition of a ‘voluntary patient’ 
under s. 2 of the Mental Health Act 2001. Dublin: Irish Human Rights Commission.   
Keys, M. (2002) Mental Health Act 2001.  Dublin: Round Hall.  
Kilkelly, U. (Ed.). (2009) ECHR and Irish law. 2nd edition. Bristol: Jordan Publishing. 
Lynn, M. (2010) ‘The Mental Health Act 2001: paternalistic or rights-based?’, Mental Health Law 
Conference. University College Cork, 26 February. Cork: Irish Mental Health Lawyers Association. 
Mental Health Commission (2014) Annual report 2013. Dublin: Mental Health Commission.   
Morrissey, F. (2012) ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: a new 
approach to decision-making in mental health law’, European Journal of Health Law, 19 (5), pp. 423-
40.   
Murray, C. (2010) ‘Reinforcing paternalism within Irish mental health law - contrasting the decisions in 
EH v St Vincent’s Hospital and Others and SM v The Mental Health Commission and Others’, Dublin 
University Law Journal, 32, pp.273-290. 
O’Neill, A. (2005) Irish mental health law. Dublin: First Law.  
Szmukler, G., Daw, R. and Callard, F. (2014) ‘Mental health law and the UN Convention on the rights 
of persons with disabilities’, International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 37 (3), pp. 245-52.   
 15 
 
Teff, H. (1994) Reasonable care: legal perspectives on the doctor-patient relationship. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.  
Whelan, D. (2009) Mental health law and practice: civil and criminal aspects. Dublin: Round Hall.     
Whelan, D. (2012) ‘Can the right to personal liberty be interpreted in a paternalistic manner?: cases on 
the Mental Health Act 2001’, forthcoming, Irish Human Rights Law Review. Available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1798872.   
 
